BICENTENNIALIZING FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION
Eugene Gressman *
I.

INTRODUCTION

Among the crown jewels of the Bill of Rights are the freedoms of expression embedded in the First Amendment.' The
words, totaling thirty-three in number, are seemingly clear and
crisp: "Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
*
"2
grievances.
The time has now come to pay a bicentennial homage to
these constitutional promises of free expression. To do so re* A.B., 1938, J.D. 1940, University of Michigan. Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law Emeritus, University of North Carolina School of Law. The author
gratefully acknowledges the assistance of two of his Seton Hall colleagues, Professors Michael Ambrosio and Lawrence Fleischer, in the preparation of this article.
They have opened many historical and philosophical doors leading to an understanding of the source and nature of the freedoms of expression.
I At the author's request. all references to the various parts of the Constitution
will remain capitalized.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The four freedoms or rights specified in the First
Amendment "have never been clearly differentiated; rather the First Amendment
has been construed as guaranteeing a composite right to freedom of expression.
The term 'freedom of speech,' therefore, in popular usage as well as in legal doctrine, has been considered roughly coextensive with the whole of the First Amendment."
Emerson, Freedom of Speech, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITtrrION 790 (1986).
See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (citations omitted) ("It was
not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were
coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble
and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable. They are cognate rights ....
and therefore are united in the First Article's
assurance."); Lewis, A Preferred Positionfor Journalism?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 599
(1979) ("The framers wanted to protect expression whether in unprinted or
printed form. . . . The two phrases ["freedom of speech" and "freedom of the
press"] were used interchangeably, then as now, to mean freedom of expression.").
See also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) ("The right of peaceable
assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally
fundamental."); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222
(1967) ("We start with the premise that the rights to assemble peaceably and to
petition for a redress of grievances are among the most precious of the liberties
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. These rights, moreover, are intimately connected, both in origin and in purpose, with the other First Amendment rights of
free speech and free press.").
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quires more than a literal reading of the clear, crisp language,
more than a search for some ephemeral "original intent" of the
framers of that language. Attention must also be paid to the historical and philosophical context out of which arises the concept
of the freedom to speak one's mind without governmental interference. Then add the fact that these 200-year-old words must
somehow accommodate the vastly expanding modes of expression and repression that mark our modern technological society.
Particularly during the past fifty years, there has been an explosive growth in the number of occasions and situations in which
the legitimacy of expressive speech or conduct depends upon a
new or expanded interpretation of these few words. As the second Justice Harlan once observed, "[t]he constitutional right of
free expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and
populous as ours." 3
Sitting in brooding omnipresence over all these dynamic elements of free expression is the Supreme Court of the United
States. On that Court rests the responsibility for giving ongoing
life, meaning, and application to these few words written so many
years ago. The result has been a rich and growing jurisprudence
of free expression, thereby reconstructing the First Amendment
into what Justice Scalia has called "A House with Many Mansions." 4 But within that house lies a bicentennial anomaly.
The 1789 work by the congressional drafters of the free expression provisions was virtually still-born, at least insofar as judicial respect and enforcement were concerned.
Those
magnificent promises lay fallow and largely untended by the federal judiciary for nearly 130 years. During the latter part of the
nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth, there were
numerous cases in state and federal courts involving claimed denials of freedom of expression. 5 But the overwhelming majority
of these courts
rejected free speech claims, often by ignoring their existence.
No court was more unsympathetic to freedom of expression
than the Supreme Court, which rarely produced even a dis3

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).

4 This phrase is the title ofJustice Scalia's remarks, delivered in 1986 prior to

his elevation to the Supreme Court, at a Macalester College conference on the Constitution, freedom of expression, and the liberal arts. See THE CONSTITUTIoN, THE
LAW, AND FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 1787-1987, at 9 (J. Stewart ed. 1987) (for a
printed record of the remarks).
5 See, e.g., Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907); Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333 (1890).
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senting opinion in a First Amendment case. Most decisions by
lower federal courts and state courts were also restrictive,
although there were some notable exceptions.... [T]he widespread judicial hostility to the value of free speech transcended any individual issue or litigant. 6
Not until after the end of World War I did the nation or the
Court begin to give serious heed to what was written in 1789. And
only several decades thereafter did the Court begin the serious job
of reconstructing the First Amendment in accord with the 1789
master plans. Thus, to celebrate the bicentennial of the free expression guarantees is to do little more than honor the foresight and the
written promises of the framers, rather than to celebrate two centuries of enforcing those promises. We have not even reached the
centennial mark with respect to putting judicial flesh on the bare
bones of these thirty-three words.
We begin our bicentennial tale with a review of the historical
and philosophical sources and justifications for recognizing and
protecting the right of each individual to speak freely, to write
freely, to assemble peaceably, and to petition for a redress of grievances. 7 We shall then examine which, if any, of these justifications
underlie the creation of the First Amendment, and which justifications underlie the Supreme Court's stewardship of the First Amend6 Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514, 523 (1981).
This article has done much to dispel the scholarly notion that the Supreme Court's
concerns with the First Amendment did not begin until Congress passed the Espionage Act in 1917, resulting in such decisions as Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919). As Rabban pointed out, in the generation preceding World War I the
consequences of industrialization led to great social unrest and radical activity, such
as the violence associated with the Homestead and Pullman strikes in the 1890's,
the fear of anarchists generated by the Haymarket riot of 1886, and the notoriety of
World War I and Emma Goldman in the early 1900's. Rabban, supra, at 519. Such
turbulence led those involved to increase their reliance on First Amendment protections. During this pre-war period, Rabban noted:
[The Supreme Court] refused to apply the First Amendment to state
action, found no First Amendment concerns in statutes restricting the
use of the mails, simply ignored free speech issues in some cases, and
held that certain categories of expression did not constitute 'speech.'
On those relatively few occasions when it directly addressed the meaning of the First Amendment, the Court uniformly upheld restrictions on
speech. Only a few opinions contained signs of a more generous interpretation of the value of free speech and the scope of the First
Amendment.
Id. at 525.
7 For more comprehensive overviews of the theoretical and practical justifications for recognizing that all individuals should be able to express themselves
freely, see F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15-86 (1982);
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-93
(1963).
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ment in contemporary times. We shall also examine whether the
Court's role in giving life to these constitutional guarantees is consistent with the root purposes of the 1789 promises. Finally, what of
the efforts in 1989, the bicentennial year, to amend or repeal the socalled "flag-burning" portion of the First Amendment?
II.

THE ROOTS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

What is the philosophical and realistic source of the First
Amendment right to freedom of expression? We find that history answers that question by offering at least four explanations
or justifications, each of which finds some support in Supreme
Court jurisprudence.
A.

The Searchfor Truth

Historically, the most frequent argument advanced to justify
freedom of expression is that such freedom leads to the discovery
of truth. Political truths can be found and rational judgments can
be reached, so the argument goes, only if we allow open discussion, free exchange of ideas, examination and consideration of all
the facts and contentions, and the full use of all schools of
thought to sift the true from the false. As John Stuart Mill wrote
in his 1859 essay On Liberty:
[I]f any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for
aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility ... though the silenced opinion be
an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of
truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision
of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any
chance of being supplied.8
This notion that the search for truth is the sine qua non of the
freedoms of speech and press first emerged at the Supreme Court
8 J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 115-16 (Penguin Books ed. 1982). Earlier, in 1644,John
Milton argued, in his essay Areopagitica, that the prior restraint doctrine should be
abandoned by Parliament because it discouraged learning and the search for truth.
In Milton's words: "And though all the windes of doctrine were let loose to play
upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licencing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falshood grapple; who ever knew Truth
put to the wors, in a free and open encounter." Milton, Areopagitica, in 4 THE
WORKS OFJOHN MILTON 347 (W. Hailer ed. 193 1). However, Milton's reputation as
the earliest great apostle of the human mind and the search for truth suffers from
his other writings to the effect that freedom of inquiry and debate should be limited
to Protestants. See L. LEvY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 93-97 (1985).
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level in the dissent of Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States.9
There he wrote that the ultimate good desired by the holders of
strong opinions "is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out."'" Justice Brandeis continued this "truth-seeking" dialogue in his concurrence in
Whitney v. California," writing that those who won this nation's independence "believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak
as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion
would be futile ...

.""

In more recent times, the Court has fre-

quently accepted and reiterated the Holmes-Brandeis truth-seeking
formula forjustifying free speech. In Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. Federal Communications Commission," for example, the Court proclaimed:
"It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail."' 4
Similarly, in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,' 5 the Court
emphasized that, in the contemplation of the First Amendment,
freedom to speak one's mind "is essential to the common quest for
truth and the vitality of society as a whole."' 6
Identifying the common quest for truth as a justification for
preserving each individual's right to speak freely has several serious
17
flaws, as Professor Schauer has so convincingly demonstrated.
9 250 U.S. 616 (1919).

10 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

11 274 U.S. 357 (1927).

12 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). See also Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War
Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 956 (1919). In his book Chafee stated:
The true meaning of freedom of speech seems to be this. One of the
most important purposes of society and government is the discovery
and spread of truth on subjects of general concern. This is possible only
through absolutely unlimited discussion, for . . . once force is thrown
into the argument, it becomes a matter of chance whether it is thrown
on the false side or the true, and truth loses all its natural advantage in
the contest.
Chafee also considered the First Amendment "a declaration of national policy in
favor of the public discussion of all public questions." Id. at 934.
13 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
14 Id. at 390.
15 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
16 Id. at 503-04. This language from Bose was approvingly quoted by ChiefJustice Rehnquist in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1988). Justice
Powell in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534
(1980), similarly echoed the Holmes-Brandeis remarks regarding the search for
political truths in the marketplace of free discussion.
17 See F. SCHAUER, supra note 7, at 25-34.
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First, this argument rests on certain assumptions that cannot be historically or empirically demonstrated. The assumptions are: that
there is such a thing as the "truth" in matters of public concern and
that the "truth" will emerge and prevail over the "false" when juxtaposed; that there is such a thing as the "truth" to be uncovered in
robust debates over nonpolitical matters and pursuits; and the
"truth" in any of these contexts is that which ultimately prevails in
the metaphoric marketplace of ideas, a marketplace in which the
public, or at least those of the public who participate in the debate,
rationally consider all points of view and tolerate or encourage differing and perhaps irrational arguments.' In short, the truth-seeking justification unrealistically equates the public processes of
arriving at general policy decisions with the more rational and academic techniques of reaching scientific "truths" or conclusions.' 9
Second, the truth-seeking argument elevates the search for
"truth" to a position of absolute priority over all other values. Public policy decisions involve many other values, such as compromise
and overriding public concerns, that may dilute or even erase the
so-called "truth." Yet, to the extent that the truth-seeking argument is forced to concede that there may be time, place, and manner
restrictions on the perceived "truth," the argument becomes little
more than a truism, such as the "truth" is one of the values to be
considered in the course of public dialogue. It should also be noted
that, in our form of government, the ultimate power to determine
what is a political "truth" and to reject what is "false" often lies
more in the realm of governmental bodies than in the general public. It is in those bodies that various other values may come to the
fore.
18

"And what of falsity: is not the right to differ about what is 'the truth' subtly

endangered by a theory that perceives communication as no more than a system of
transactions for vanquishing what is false?" L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 12-1, at 786 (2d ed. 1988) (emphasis in original).
19 It is hardly surprising that the search for truth was so central in the writings of Milton, Locke, Voltaire, and Jefferson. They placed their faith in
the ability of reason to solve problems and distinguish truth from falsehood. They had confidence in the reasoning power of all people, if only

that power were allowed to flourish. The argument from truth is very
much a child of the Enlightenment, and of the optimistic view of the
rationality and perfectibility of humanity it embodied. But the naivete
of the Enlightenment has since been largely discredited by history and
by contemporary insights of psychology. People are not nearly so rational as the Enlightenment assumed, and without this assumption the
empirical support for the argument from truth evaporates.
F. SCHAUER, supra note 7, at 26 (emphasis in original).
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Promotion of Democracy

Closely allied with the "truth-seeking" purpose of free
speech is the Alexander Meiklejohn argument that the First
Amendment protects free speech as being indispensable to the
effective operation of a democratic form of government. 20 This
argument proceeds on the theory that "We the People" are constitutional sovereigns and that government derives its just powers from the consent of these sovereigns. From that, the
argument follows that full freedom of expression is necessary in
order to form the individual and collective judgments of the people, judgments to which government must be responsive in a
democratic society. Freedom of expression, under this theory,
also serves as a check on abuse of power by public officials.
Justice Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney v. California2 1 emphasized this "pro-democracy" justification, proclaiming that the
framers believed that "public discussion is a political duty" and
that the path of a safe, stable government "lies in the opportunity
22
to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies.
The Court has echoed these "pro-democracy" sentiments on numerous occasions. In Stromberg v. California,2 1 the Court opined
that "[t]he maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will
of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means,
an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system." '2 4 A unanimous
8 (1960); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
1 (1948). See also Brennan, The
Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretationof the FirstAmendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1965) (comparing Meiklejohn's views with those of Supreme Court opinions).
21 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
22 Id. at 375 (Brandeis,J., concurring). This Brandeis celebration of free speech
as a political duty that takes civic courage in our society was quoted by the Court in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See also Blasi, The First
Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California,
29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1988) (analyzing the Brandeis opinion and concluding
that it was one of the turning points in the history of First Amendment
adjudication).
23 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
24 Id. at 369. This quotation has been repeated several times by the Court. See,
e.g., Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). Sullivan also quotes the
sentiment from Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957), that the freedom
of expression secured by the First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired
by the people." Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269.
20

See A.

MEIKLEJOHN,

POLITICAL FREEDOM

SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
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Court, in Dejonge v. Oregon,25 stated that the preservation of the
constitutional rights of free speech, free press, and free assembly,
is imperative "in order to maintain the opportunity for free public discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to
the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means." 2 6
Without in any way denigrating the importance of free
speech in a democratic society, we can perceive that this "democracy-promotion" theory may prove too much in some respects.
If we consider the people collectively to be sovereign, "then acceptance of this view of democracy compels acceptance of the
power of the sovereign to restrict the liberty of speech just as that
sovereign may restrict any other liberty. ' 27 Majority rule is certainly the essence of democracy. However, just as certainly, the
First Amendment does not mean that the sovereign, having been
fully advised by a cacaphony of free voices, can in the name of a
majoritarian democracy forbid or suppress minority viewpoints.
Moreover, the "democracy-promotion" argument, like the
truth-seeking" argument, projects a national town-meeting scenario, where political and other public matters are vigorously debated and then rationally resolved. But there is no room in this
scenario for free speech, or arriving at the "truth," in matters
such as art, literature, drama, history, or ethics,2 8 or for the various forms of commercial free speech.2 9 When these arguments
299 U.S. 353 (1937).
Id. at 365. See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575
(1980) ("expressly guaranteed [First Amendment] freedoms share a common core
purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government").
27 F. SCHAUER, supra note 7, at 40.
28 "But our cases have never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters . . . is not entitled to full First
Amendment protection." Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977).
On the other hand, certain types of expression - the obscene, the profane, the
libelous, the insulting or "fighting" words - on occasion fall outside the constitutional wall of protection, the theory being that "such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality. " Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942). Cf. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971) (arguing that only political speech, as opposed to scientific or literary utterances, should be protected - an argument that Bork later revised).
29 "There is no longer any room to doubt that what has come to be known as
'commercial speech' is entitled to the protection of the First Amendment, albeit to
protection somewhat less extensive than that afforded 'noncommercial speech.'"
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985).
25

26
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are expanded to encompass freedom of expression in the nonpolitical areas of human endeavor, the arguments are not very
helpful in justifying the broad sweep of the First Amendment.
C.

Individual Self-Fulfillment

The right of free expression has also been justified as a natural right of each of us in our individual capacities. As Professor
Emerson has noted, this argument derives from
the widely accepted premise of Western thought that the
proper end of man is the realization of his character and potentialities as a human being. . . . From this it follows that
every man - in the development of his own personality - has

the right to form his own beliefs and opinions. And, it also
follows, that he has the right to express these beliefs and opinions. Otherwise they are of little account.3 °
A corollary to this notion is that the health of a nation of self-government is nurtured by the contributions of free-thinking individuals, that development of the individual is a requisite of democracy. 3 '
On various occasions the Supreme Court has recognized this
"self-fulfillment" theory, while refusing to give it complete dominance in the marketplace of public affairs. In Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States,3 2 for example, the Court wrote that "the freedom to speak one's mind is ... an aspect of individual liberty -

and

itself."'33

thus a good unto
Writing for the Court in First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,3 4 Justice Powell stated that "[t]he individual's interest in self-expression is a concern of the First Amendment
separate from the concern for open and informed discussion,
although the two often converge." 3 5 Or, as explained in Garrison v.
30 Emerson, supra note 7, at 879. Professor Schauer conceives the "self-fulfillment" argument to be composed of two elements: (1) free speech is "a good in
itself, without need of further justification;" (2) free speech is "among the primary
components of that amorphous credo that is commonly called 'liberalism,' " with
its preoccupation with "individualism and individual rights, especially as against the
state or against the majority." F. SCHAUER, supra note 7, at 48, 60. See also Redish,
The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) (emphasizing the value of

"individual self-realization").
31 See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 879 (1970) (for an
elaboration of the "self-fulfillment" thesis). See generally Bollinger, Free Speech and
Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438 (1983) (advancing the notion that free speech is a

protected way of pressing for one's intellectual capacity or perspective that may be
of direct value elsewhere, such as in social decisionmaking).
32 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
33 Id. at 503-04. The Court in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-51
(1988), approvingly quoted this language from Bose.
34 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
35

Id.

at 777 n.12. Citing this Bellotti footnote, Justice Powell in Consolidated
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Louisiana, 66" speech concerning public affairs is3 7 more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government."It is somewhat unrealistic to treat the First Amendment as a
therapeutic forum for individuals seeking self-fulfillment. For some
individuals, that may be true. But the concept of self-fulfillment is
not very helpful to an analysis of free speech. As Professor Schauer
has noted, because virtually any activity may be a form of self-expression and because speech is only one of those forms, "a theory
that does not isolate speech from this vast range of other conduct
causes freedom of speech to collapse into a principle of general
liberty. "38
Then too, this theory becomes less and less useful in our highly
complex and pluralistic society, where greater citizen obligations
and greater interdependence and interactions among diverse individuals make it difficult to define freedom of expression primarily in
terms of individual self-fulfillment. An orderly complex society may
need to impose more constraints and obligations on individuals.
Such governmental claims for constraint, legitimate or not, can no
longer be intelligently assessed or resisted by a blanket reliance on
an unrestricted, wholly personal right of self-fulfillment.
D.

A Broader Vision of Free Expression

The three justifications for freedom of expression - "truthseeking," "democracy-promotion," and "self-fulfillment" - are
at best highly relevant on occasions and at worst incomplete.
None of the three really addresses or explains the source of this
great freedom. What is needed, rather, is a broader vision of the
source and meaning of the First Amendment guarantees of free
expression, a vision that encompasses all three of these traditional viewpoints and yet is not subject to their theoretical constrictions and limitations. An adequate theory of the purpose for
protecting First Amendment freedoms must also be intertwined
with the increasingly complex societal demands for an orderly
way of life.
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.2 (1980), noted that
"[fOreedom of speech also protects the individuals interest in self-expression." The
Consolidated Edison statement was footnoted to quotations from the Holmes-Brandeis arguments that freedom of speech is indispensable to the discovery of political
truth and that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market. See supra notes 10, 12.
36 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
37 Id. at 74-75.
38 F. SCHAUER, supra note 7, at 52.
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Perhaps the best place to start the construction of an adequate theory is to realize that, from the dawn of our constitutional history to the present day, freedom of thought and speech
has been considered "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom. ' '39 Textually, the First
Amendment does not link the protection it affords with any particular objective. Protection is available whether the individual's
form of expression be directed toward seeking political or other
truths, participating in the processes of democracy, advancing
one's own need for self-fulfillment, or achieving some other goal.
The expression does not lose protection because it voices
thoughts most hated by the majority, or because it is projected in
coarse or vulgar terms. Additionally, the protected expression
can relate to any conceivable matter, not being limited to issues
of a political nature. The First Amendment literally embraces
"all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to
enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of
40
their period."
What, then, makes freedom of expression so all-encompassing, so much the matrix of all other freedoms? What is the
source or nature of that freedom? Is it something more
profound than the natural urge for self-fulfillment? Could it be
that freedom of thought and conscience is one of those "unalienable rights" of individuals, "endowed by their Creator," that the
Declaration of Independence proclaimed to be "self-evident?" Is
freedom of expression one of those natural rights, an innate part
of the human spirit, that inspired American revolutionary thinking? If so, then we come close to Professor Schauer's contempo39 The phrase is that of Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). Compare Black, Further Reflections on the ConstitutionalJustice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1110 (1986) (Professor Black's
comment about this phrase: "I would like to look Cardozo straight in his gentle
eyes and ask him to consider whether the rights to freedom from gnawing hunger
and from preventable sickness may not form 'the matrix, the indispensable condi-

tion, of nearly every other form' of freedom."). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at
778. ("[P]hysical survival is certainly as 'indispensable' to the enjoyment of other
freedoms as are speech or voting. One must be able to express oneself to protest

the violation of other rights, but to express oneself one needs at least a decent level
of nourishment, shelter, clothing, medical care, and education.").
40 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). The Court has often said that
the First Amendment was designed to secure "the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources," Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), and "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
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rary notion that individual sovereignty, or individual autonomy,
provides the source and the foundation for
a theory of freedom of speech premised on the ultimate sanctity of individual choice.., some sort of private domain of the
mind, some area that is under the exclusive control of the individual ... [that] is off limits to the state, not only as a matter of
moral right, but also as a matter of necessity... that portion of
my personality that is an exclusive preserve against governmental interference. 4
To premise freedom of expression on this innate sanctity of individual autonomy may strike some as a revival of natural rights philosophy, much-maligned in modern times and often treated as an
historical oddity.4 2 We are not, however, concerned with the whole
4 F. SCHAUER, supra note 7, at 68. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion
in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), expressed
much the same idea. There he wrote that
probing into men's thoughts trenches on those aspects of individual
freedom which we rightly regard as the most cherished aspects of Western civilization. The cardinal article of faith of our civilization is the
inviolate character of the individual. A man can be regarded as an individual and not as a function of the state only if he is protected to the
largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of
his person.
Id. at 421.
In like vein, Professor Greenawalt has written:
Expressions of beliefs and feelings lie closer to the core of our persons
than do most actions that we perform; restrictions of expression may
offend dignity to a greater degree than most other restrictions; and selective restrictions based on the content of our ideas may imply a specially significant inequality.

K.

GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME,

AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE

34 (1989).

Professor Ely is a preeminent maligner of natural rights. He has written that
natural rights, like natural law, is a thoroughly discredited idea in our society, since
natural law "can be invoked to support anything you want . . . and everybody understands that." J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 50 (1980). He adds that "the
42

only propositions with a prayer of passing themselves off as 'natural law' are those
so uselessly vague that no one will notice - something along the 'No one should
needlessly inflict suffering' line." Id. at 51. He writes, in conclusion, that the notion of a discoverable and valid set of moral principles - or natural rights - cannot "plausibly serve to overturn the decisions of our elected representatives." Id.
at 54.
However, the Ely thesis does not address or answer the historical fact that the
various freedoms of expression were considered by the framers of the Bill of Rights
to be "natural rights" to be protected against the majoritarian decisions of our
elected representatives. The fact that the concept of natural rights may appear to
Ely and others to be vague and open-ended in other contexts does not detract from
the historical fact that at least four "natural rights" of expression were written into
the First Amendment. The sooner we appreciate that empirical fact, the better we
can understand the nature and the source of these freedoms. Moreover, it is not
the thesis of this article that the natural rights source of these freedoms constitutes
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range of natural rights or natural law. Nor are we concerned with
the judicial art of recognizing or creating new natural rights out of
some of the more general constitutional language, such as "liberty,"
"due process," and "equal protection. '4 3 Our task is simply to examine the "natural rights" source and nature of the four freedoms
of expression expressly identified and embedded in the First
Amendment.4 4 If it be modern heresy to look at these four freedoms through a natural rights lens, so be it.
History teaches that "human" or "fundamental" rights are simply contemporary idioms for "natural" rights.4 5 One cannot escape
the fact that mankind has the ability to reason, to declare what is
right or wrong, and to express thoughts and emotions to others.
Those abilities distinguish mankind from animals. Aristotle understood this and so did those who drafted the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. It matters not whether we describe this
fact of life as in the nature of natural rights, human rights, or fundamental rights.
The important point is that protecting this rational, thinking
the exclusive standard for judicial review of First Amendment claims, or that a recognition of that source authorizes a judge to use his subjective notions of natural
rights in the process of constitutional adjudication.
43 Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (The Bowers Court stated
that it is not "inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover
new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause.").
44 The term "natural rights" is used in this discussion, rather than "natural
law," because the basic socio-political principles of the American Revolution derive
from the natural rights tradition of the eighteenth century. Although sometimes
used synonymously, the terms "natural rights" and "natural law" must be carefully
distinguished to avoid confusion and error. There are many variations of natural
law concepts, ranging from St. Thomas Aquinas' idea that natural law is premised
on the existence of God and thus discoverable through reason, to the Protestant
view of natural law as the arbitrary will of God and thus not discoverable through
reason, to the modern theories in which natural law is conceived as a process of
decision making rather than a substantive doctrine. Natural law, generally speaking, is a broad, all-encompassing theory of the moral and spiritual nature of society.
What is a moral or ethical society? What is a just society?
Natural rights, on the other hand, more narrowly focus on but one aspect of
humankind, one's innate ability to reason, think and communicate to others. That
ability translates into "rights" for purposes of the natural rights philosophy. That
philosophy teaches that "rights" reflect the natural state of mankind before the
formation of a civil society. The theory is that mankind entered into the social
compact of government in order to establish an orderly society in which the preexisting natural rights would be preserved and secured against undue governmental interference. See Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional
Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 365 (1928) (for an overview ofthe natural rights philosophy emanating at the time the Constitution was written). A more comprehensive
discussion of the philosophy of natural rights is found in J. FINNiS, NATURAL LAW
AND NATURAL RIGHTS, ch. 8, at 198-230 (1980).
45 Id. at 198.
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component of the human psyche is part of our constitutional heritage. It is that rational, thinking component that makes freedom of
expression so uniquely important, so much the matrix of all other
forms of freedom. The First Amendment, like the rest of the Bill of
Rights, was born in the eighteenth century Age of Enlightenment,
when one of the dominant themes of American political thought was
an understanding that natural and unalienable rights do exist and
that the uninhibited exercise of those rights is essential to one's pursuit of happiness. Freedom of speech and thought and other forms
of expression were deemed the most obvious, the most significant of
those natural and unalienable rights. We cannot ignore or deny that
historical understanding any more than we can ignore modern insights into the nature of our reasoning and expressive powers.
It is in that historical understanding of the rational nature of
human beings that we find the source of the right of free expression.
The source of the rights and liberties protected by the Bill of Rights,
Justice Stevens has observed, lies not in the Bill of Rights itself, but
in the fact that our constitutional forefathers believed it "self-evident" that "all men are endowed by their Creator with liberty as one
of the cardinal unalienable rights. It is that basic freedom which the
Due Process Clause, [which incorporates the First Amendment],
protects, rather than the particular rights or privileges conferred by
specific laws or regulations. '"46 And so it is that the First Amendment is not the source of natural or fundamental rights of expression but only a series of limitations on the power of government to
abridge or infringe upon the unalienable, autonomous rights endowed to all humankind. The extent to which government recognizes and protects those rights is what distinguishes a free
democracy from an autocratic dictatorship.
Moreover, a recognition that freedom of expression springs
from the natural and unique nature of the individual serves well in
our modern complex society as a foundation or starting point for
the supporting arguments - that free expression aids in the search
for truth, promotes democracy and more responsible government,
and helps individuals achieve self-fulfillment. Free expression, as an
exercise in individual autonomy, does all that and more. As Justice
Jackson once observed, the
Constitution relies on our electorate's complete ideological
46 Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, ]., dissenting). The
majority opinion in Meachum did not deny the accuracy ofJustice Stevens' observation. Additionally, the Court in Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845
(1977) approvingly cited this observation.
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freedom to nourish independent and responsible intelligence
and preserve our democracy from that submissiveness, timidity and herd-mindedness of the masses which would foster a
tyranny of mediocrity. The priceless heritage of our society is
the unrestricted constitutional right of each member to think
as he will.4 7
While the Supreme Court has never fully identified the human
psyche as the source of any of the rights of expression protected by
the First Amendment, echoes of the natural rights theory can be
heard in numerous opinions arising under the First Amendment
and other portions of the Constitution.4 8 The whole judicial construct of fundamental or implied rights is nothing more than the
modern idiomatic expression of the natural and unalienable rights
theory. As ChiefJustice Burger once remarked, it is a fact that many
"fundamental rights, even though not expressly guaranteed, have
been recognized by the Court as indispensable to the enjoyment of
rights explicitly defined." 4 9 The Court has indeed held that it is indispensable to the enjoyment of the First Amendment freedoms of
expression to recognize the cognate rights to listen, to observe and
learn from the speaker or writer, to associate freely with others, and
to have access to information about the administration of criminal
and civil justice.50 If the freedoms enumerated in the First Amendment are of natural rights stock, how can the indispensable but
unarticulated rights implied therefrom be anything other than natural and unalienable in nature?
It is not unusual to find references to the philosophy of natural
or fundamental rights in other areas of the Court's jurisprudence.
The first such case came in 1823, when Justice Bushrod Washington, sitting on circuit, concluded that the privileges and immunities
mentioned in Article IV of the Constitution encompassed those
privileges "which are in their very nature, fundamental; which belong to the citizens of all free governments."'"
47 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48 See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908) (an early example of
defining procedural due process by reference to natural or inalienable rights of

citizens).
49 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,.580 (1980).
50

See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 832 (1974) ("the First and Four-

teenth Amendments also protect the right of the public to receive such information
and ideas as are published"); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (the
"right to receive information and ideas," regardless of their social worth, is fundamental to our free society).
51 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (on
circuit). Among the fundamental rights mentioned by Justice Washington were the
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Liberty and due process jurisprudence have also been productive of references to the natural or fundamental rights philosophy.
Thus, when the Court indicated, in Griswold v. Connecticut,52 that the
First Amendment constitutes an element of personal privacy from
which other privacy rights may emanate, 5 3 it recognized that at the
core of freedom of expression is individual sovereignty or autonomy, an area of innate privacy that extends beyond the bounds of
the First Amendment. But when the Court tries to articulate some
natural right, some privacy right, other than the ones specifically
mentioned in the First Amendment or some other portion of the
Bill of Rights, the Court enters a most controversial field. Then it
must weave a natural right out of broad constitutional cloth, such as
the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and due process
of law. 54
The seminal example is Meyer v. Nebraska,5 5 in which the Court
spoke of the constitutionally protected
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to. worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common
right of a citizen of one state to pass through or reside in another state for purposes
of trade or otherwise, to claim the benefit of the habeas corpus writ, to institute and
maintain actions of any kind in courts of the state, to take, hold and dispose of
property, and an exemption from taxes higher than paid by other citizens of the
state. Id. The Supreme Court later rejected the natural rights theory as respects the
Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1873); Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislations, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1332-33 (1952) (describing the original intent of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate fundamental or natural
rights into the Privileges and Immunities Clause). But some aspects of the Corfield
holding seemingly live on in later cases. See Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n of
Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 387-88 (1978) (citing Corfield as "seemingly" based on notions of fundamental rights "in the modern as well as the 'natural right' sense," and
holding that elk hunting in Montana by non-residents is not a "fundamental" or
"basic" or "natural" right); Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 661 (1975)
(relying on Corfield to invalidate a state tax that violated the out-of-state citizen's
"fundamental" right to be exempt from taxes higher than those paid by citizens of
the state); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 396 (1876) (right to acquire common
property does not "belong of right to the citizens of all free governments").
52 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
53 Id. at 483.
54 Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (The Court was not "inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new fundamental
rights embedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.").
55 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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law as6 essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.5

While only the right to worship freely is specifically mentioned in
the Bill of Rights, all of this Meyer language certainly resonates with
the sounds of the Declaration of Independence and the natural or
57
fundamental rights philosophy. The modern Court has ascribed
the survival and frequent reaffirmance of this Meyer language to what
Justice Harlan conceived to be the essence of due process - "the
balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the
liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society." 5 8 That too is of the essence of the
natural or fundamental rights theory.
The Court has expanded this natural rights concept of liberty to
encompass freedom of the individual's autonomous "choice with respect to childbearing .... the rights of parents to the custody and
companionship of their own children, . . . [and] traditional parental
authority in matters of child rearing and education." ' 59 Indeed,
most of the non-First Amendment rights of privacy and individual
choice recognized by the Court, including a woman's choice to seek
an abortion, have been carved out of the fundamental or natural
rights that have been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty and due process concepts.60 So too, in Rochin v. California,6 1 the Court ruled that the forcible extraction of defendant's
stomach contents violated due process because such illegal "breaking into the privacy" of the defendant "shocks the conscience" and
is "offensive to human dignity." 6
Human privacy and dignity, as
56 Id. at 399. This Meyer statement was approvingly quoted in Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972). See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925) (applying Meyers to "liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control").
57 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 501 n.8 (1977) (plurality

opinion).
58 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In his Poe
dissent, Justice Harlan also wrote that the "liberty" guaranteed by the Constitution
is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of
property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep

and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures;
and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes
a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless

restraints.
Id.at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
59 Moore, 431 U.S. at 500-01.
60 See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816. 843 & n.49 (1977).
61

342 U.S. 165 (1952).

6'2Id. at 172-74. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the Court's opinion in Rochin,

took pains to answer the complaint of justices Black and Douglas, expressed in
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well as the conscience of society, are thus embedded in the naturalfundamental rights philosophy that permeates the Bill of Rights.
Justice Harlan came close to articulating the individual auton63
omy theory of free speech when he penned Cohen v. California.
There he wrote, on behalf of the Court, that the constitutional right
of free expression
is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints
from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to
what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us,
in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a
more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of
individual
dignity and choice upon which our political system
64
rests.

Justice Harlan, at the end of this statement, referenced Justice
Brandeis' much-admired concurrence in Whitney v. California.65 In
somewhat narrower political terms, Justice Brandeis defended
"freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think" as a means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth and as
essential both to "stable government" and to "political change. "66
Those who won our independence, he said, "did not fear political
change" and "did not exalt order at the cost of liberty."' 67 Thus,
their concurring opinions in Rochin, that placing the decision on the Court's view of
what shocks the conscience or offends a sense ofjustice is a revival of "natural law."
Justices Black and Douglas preferred to find that such police conduct violated the
self-incrimination provisions of the Fifth Amendment, which are incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. In Justice Frankfurter's view,
the concept of due process is not final or fixed in time, or bounded by the specific
provisions of the Bill of Rights. Rather, the concept involves "considerations
deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions of the legal profession."
Id. at 171. Such considerations, said Justice Frankfurter, include the privacy and
the dignity of the individual, a privacy and a dignity that may be invaded by governrnent to the point of offending a court's conscience and the community's sense of
fair play and decency - all quite apart from, if not in addition to, the constitutional
proscription of coerced self-incrimination. Justice Frankfurter had earlier elaborated his due process views in his concurring opinion in Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Additionally, Justice Murphy's dissent in Adamson argued that the due process concept is not "entirely and necessarily
limited by the Bill of Rights" and that occasions may arise "where a proceeding
falls so far short of conforming to fundamental standards of procedure as to warrant constitutional condemnation in terms of a lack of due process despite the absence of a specific provision in the Bill of Rights." Id. at 124 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting).
63 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
64 Id. at 24.
65 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis. J.,joined by Holmes, J., concurring).
t-,; Id
67 Id. ;1(377 (Brandeis. J., joined by Holmes. J.. concurring).
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"[r]ecognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities,
they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly
should be guaranteed." 6 8 What is most helpful about the Brandeis
statement is the vision of the First Amendment as primarily protecting the expression of minority or unpopular views against "the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities."
One final element must be added to this individual autonomy
theory. Freedom of expression, as the Court has consistently recognized, cannot be exercised in a manner "at odds with the premises
of democratic government and with the orderly manner in which
economic, social, or political change is to be effected." 6 9 The
human ability to express oneself, whether orally or in writing, or as
symbolized by conduct, is necessarily modified and conditioned by
the society in which the expression occurs, modifications that we
often refer to as reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.
But only the most compelling governmental interest can justify the
imposition of such restrictions. In that sense only can we say that
freedom of expression is not an absolute human right and that the
state has the power to confine such expression within the bounds of
an orderly society - all of which is quite consistent with the natural
or autonomous rights moorings of the constitutional concept of
freedom of expression.7 °
What emerges from this search for the purpose or root of the
First Amendment guarantees of free expression is that the most
compelling and comprehensive rationale is found in the historic
field of natural and fundamental rights. Freedom of expression is
by definition a natural right and is so identified by the First Amendment. The ability to think, to rationalize, and to express those
68 Id. at 376 (Brandeis,J.,joined by Holmes,J., concurring). In Madison's memorable speech ofJune 8, 1789, before the House of Representatives, he introduced
amendments that were to become the Bill of Rights, arguing that the
prescriptions in favor of liberty ought to be levelled against that quarter
where the greatest danger lies, namely, that which possesses the highest
prerogative of power. But it is not found in either the executive or legislative departments of Government, but in the body of the people, operating by the majority against the minority.
2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1029 (1971).

69 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390 (1967) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964)).
70 Even John Stuart Mill conceded that "opinions lose their immunity when the
circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression
a positive instigation to some mischievous act." J. MILL, supra note 8, at 119. When
a person's expression of opinion becomes associated with some kind of conduct.
Mill wrote, and that person's conduct "affects prejudicially the interests of others,
society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or
will not be promoted by interfering with it becomes open to discussion." Id. at 141.
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thoughts constitutes the most natural, the most fundamental aspect
of a person's autonomous self. The so-called "truth-seeking," "democracy-promotion," and "self-fulfillment" rationales are more in
the nature of explanations or descriptions of the societal and individual benefits that ensue from a society of free and uninhibited discussion. They do not reflect or explain the generative source or
ultimate justification of those benefits. That source is found in the
innate characteristics - the need for individual dignity and autonomy, and the need to think and reason and express oneself freely of those who live in a free society. There is nothing in modern psychology or the other sciences that disputes those characteristics.
Nor is it necessary to ascribe.a divine source for the innate characteristics that lead to human needs for freedom of expression. The
natural-fundamental rights theory can accommodate both religious
and nonreligious adherents. 7 '
We now turn to an examination of the extent to which this natural-fundamental rights approach to free expression may have influenced the creation of the Bill of Rights, including the First
Amendment, in 1789.
III.

THE CREATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The First Amendment, like all the Bill of Rights, was a compulsory afterthought, added to the 1787 Constitution as a political ploy to secure ratification of the Constitution by several
crucial states and to quiet the loud clamor in other states for protection of individual freedoms against intrusions by the new federal government. The amendments constituting the Bill of
Rights, originally twelve in number, were drafted by the First
Congress in 1789 and submitted to the states, which ratified only
ten of them. The proposed Third Amendment thus became the
First Amendment, and the ten amendments, as we know them
today, became effective on December 15, 1791.
As a leading historian has stated, however,
the history of the framing and ratification of the Bill
of Rights indicates slight passion on the part of anyone to enshrine personal liberties in the fundamental
law of the land. We know almost nothing about what
71 Compare Judge Learned Hand's arguendo assumption that the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights "neither proceed from, nor have any warrant in, the Divine
Will, either as St. Thomas [Aquinas] orJefferson believed; but on the contrary that
they are the altogether human expression of the will of the state conventions that

ratified them." L.

HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS

2-3 (1958).
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the state legislatures thought concerning the meanings of the various amendments, and the press was
perfunctory in its reports, if not altogether silent.72
Despite the absence of much indicia of the philosophy and intent
that motivated the framers and the ratifiers of the First Amendment,
it is useful to examine the philosophical background and context in
which freedom of expression found its way into the First
Amendment.
To begin with, it is clear that the First Amendment, like the
body of the Constitution, was written at a time when American political thought was dominated by the Lockean social compact theory.73
That theory postulates an original state of nature in which people
were governed only by the laws of nature, free of human restraints.
It follows, according to this argument, that a person comes into the
world with God-given or natural rights. The person thus has a natural right to possess liberty, freedom, property, and equality - all
subsumed under the rubric of a right to the pursuit of happiness. As
John Dickinson declared in 1766, these natural rights
are created in us by the decrees of Providence, which establish
the laws of our nature. They are born with us; exist with us;
and cannot be taken from us by any human power without taking our lives. In short, they are founded on the immutable
74
maxims of reason and justice.
Thomas Jefferson certainly reflected this natural rights, or call it
fundamental rights, philosophy when he wrote the preamble to the
Declaration of Independence, a document that was a crucial step in
the developments leading to the Bill of Rights. Jefferson adhered to
Locke's philosophy in stressing the natural rights of man as the
foundation of the political order. He accordingly wrote into the
preamble that it was self-evident that all men are created equal and
that "they are endowed, by their Creator, with certain inalienable
rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." 7 5 That is pure natural or fundamental rights language.
Significance also lies in the fact that, prior to the adoption of
the Constitution, at least eight of the post-revolutionary states had
written declarations that grounded certain individual rights in "the
immutable laws of nature," rights which today we call fundamental.
72 L. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 172 (1988).

See generally A. McLAUGHLIN, THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTION63-84 (1932) (discussing the social compact theory).
74 Dickinson, An Address to the Committee of Correspondence in Barbados, in 1 WRIT73

ALISM

INGS OFJOHN DICKINSON

261 (P. Ford ed. 1895).

75 U.S. CONST. preamble.
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They too followed the Lockean concept of man's natural autonomy,
modifiable only by his consent to the rule of others in a social compact; it was a concept that had long adhered in congregational
church polity. The Virginia Constitution of 1776, for example,
started its Declaration of Rights by proclaiming that:
[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a
state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest
their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with
property, and pursuing
the means of acquiring and possessing
76
and obtaining happiness and safety.

Virginia's Declaration, while mentioning freedom of the press and
the free exercise of religion, inexplicably omitted freedom of
speech, assembly, and petition from its list of inherent rights. 77 Adhering to Virginia's natural rights philosophy, Pennsylvania created
a more comprehensive Declaration of Rights in 1776 that specifically included freedom of speech and freedom of the press, as well
as the right to assemble and petition the government, among the
"natural, inherent and inalienable rights" of mankind. 78 An even
more comprehensive Declaration of Rights emerged from Massachusetts in 1780, recognizing the "natural, essential, and unalienable rights" of inhabitants "to the freedom of speaking, writing and
publishing their sentiments." ' 79 Delaware, Maryland, and North
Carolina proclaimed similar Declarations of Rights, premised either
on the concept of natural rights or on the notion that government
emanates from a compact with the people. Vermont, not officially
admitted as a state until 1791, also issued a Declaration of Rights in
1777, proclaiming the freedoms of speech and press and the rights
of assembly and petition to be among man's "natural, inherent and
unalienable rights." 80
In 1787, when the Constitution was composed at the Philadelphia Convention, the framers largely ignored this rich lode of natural rights set forth in the various state declarations. True, they did
write certain individual liberties into the body of the Constitution,
such as a ban on religious tests as a qualification for federal office
1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 234 (1971).
Id. at 235-36. James Madison, who later drafted the federal Bill of Rights, was
a member of the Virginia Convention of 1776 that adopted this Declaration.
76
77

78
79

Id. at 264, 266.
Id. at 370, 372. John Adams was the author of the Massachusetts Declaration.

80 Id. at 322, 324. New Jersey, Georgia, New York, and South Carolina proclaimed no separate bills of rights; they simply protected certain rights in their constitutions without identifying the source of those rights.
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and a guarantee of the writ of habeas corpus. But the Convention
summarily rejected a proposal to add a full Bill of Rights, as well as
a more limited proposal to insert a guarantee of a free press. While
it is difficult to say precisely why these proposals were rejected,
Roger Sherman argued that "[tihe State Declarations of Rights are
not repealed by this Constitution; and being in force are sufficient."" As to the free press proposal, Sherman found it "unnecessary" because "[t]he power of Congress does not extend to the
Press." 8 2 Alexander Hamilton elaborated on this latter argument
when, in 1788, he wrote in the Federalist No. 84 that bills of rights
are not only unnecessary in the proposed constitution, but
would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers which are not granted; and on this very account, would afford a colourable pretext to claim more than
were granted. For why declare that things should not be done
which there is no power to do? Why for instance, should it be
said, that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when
no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will
not contend that such a provision would confer a regulating
power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed
83
to usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming that power.
While certainly not opposed to the idea of a written enumeration of the natural rights of mankind, Madison initially opposed adding a bill of rights to the Constitution. He was appalled by the
frequency of instances where states had violated their own noble
declarations. He considered the state Declarations of Rights to be
but "parchment barriers" that collapsed when "overbearing majorities in every State" violated individual liberties.8 4 Madison also regarded a federal declaration "as unnecessary and dangerous unnecessary because the general government had no power but
what was given it,8 5 dangerous because an incomplete declaration
81 Id. at 438.

Id. at 439.
Id. at 581.
84 Letter of Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in 1 B. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 76, at 616.
85 Madison argued that, because the Constitution did not vest any affirmative
power in Congress to interfere with individual rights, Congress had no power
whatever to interfere with those rights. That argument is quite specious. For example, the power to tax, which is vested in Congress, could be used to destroy or
inhibit a free press. See generally Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 251
(1936) (Congress may not, consistent with the First Amendment right of the press,
levy a tax that is measured solely by the extent of the publication for the purpose of
curtailing a select group of newspapers.). In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983), the Court noted that Richard
82
83
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6

Thus, for whatever reason, the Convention deliberately omitted
a bill of rights, an omission that history has viewed as unwise and
mistaken. Indeed almost immediately after the Constitution was
sent to the states for ratification, a cry arose for a bill of rights. Opponents of the new Constitution seized on the omission as an argument for not ratifying the document. Others proposed adding a
declaration as a matter of principle. Some states either conditioned
their ratification on a bill of rights being added or refused to ratify
unless and until such a bill was added. Ratification, particularly by
some of the crucial states, was thus put in the arena of doubt.
It was in the context of this ratification furor that the First Congress undertook the task of drafting a series of amendments to codify and protect the unalienable individual rights from intrusion by
the new federal government. As a member of the first House of
Representatives, James Madison took the lead in proposing amendments. 8 7 Introducing his first draft of the amendments, Madison
spoke and wrote in the context of his awareness and acceptance of
the then-prevalent natural or fundamental rights philosophy. He
knew full well the philosophy that had dictated the preamble of the
Declaration of Independence. He knew full well the philosophy that
had dictated the various state Declarations of Rights, as well as what
motivated the ratification furor over the absence of a bill of rights.
Madison had also written the Federalist No. 43, where he argued that
the Constitution should be ratified because it was built on "the transcendent law of nature and of nature's God, which declares that the
safety and happiness of society are the objects at which all political
institutions aim and to which all such institutions must be
Henry Lee, a prominent Anti-Federalist, refuted this specious argument by observing that Congress was not restrained by the Constitution "from laying any duties
whatever on printing, and from laying duties particularly heavy on certain pieces
printed." Id.at 584 (quoting R. Lee, Observation Leading to a Fair Examination of the
System of Government, Letter IV, reprintedin 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 76, at 466, 474.
86

3 1.BRANT,

JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION

1787-1800, at 226

(1950). This argument that the specification of particular individual rights implies
a power to abridge those rights not named is equally specious. The Federalists had
agreed to insert into the body of the Constitution the protection of trial by jury in
criminal cases and the proscription of religious tests, ex post facto laws, and bills of
attainder. Yet not even the Federalists claimed that the protections afforded those
rights implied a power to violate all other unnamed rights.
Madison later abandoned his arguments against adding a bill of rights fathering the 1789 bill of rights proposal in the House of Representatives. See infra notes
88-89 and accompanying text.
87 For an account of the legislative maneuvering leading to the drafting and submission to the states of what was to become the First Amendment, see Denbeaux,
The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1156, 1164-71 (1986).
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sacrificed.' '88
When Madison spoke to the House in June of 1789 in support
of his proposals, not surprisingly he larded his speech with natural
law references. The rights that he proposed be protected were referred to as "positive rights," as "natural rights," as "the pre-existent rights of nature," rights that he said were different from those
that are part of the compact between citizen and government, such
as the right to a jury trial.8 9 Freedom of the press and the rights of
conscience, he added, were the "choicest privileges of the
people." 90
In July of that year, the congressional drafters created specific,
numbered amendments, much in the manner of the final ten amendments. In the first draft of what is now the First Amendment, a draft
written by Representative Roger Sherman of Connecticut, the protection of freedom of expression was expressly premised on the natural rights theory:
The people have certain natural rights which are retained by
them when they enter into Society. Such are the rights of
Conscience in matters of religion; of acquiring property, and
of pursuing happiness & Safety; of Speaking, writing, and publishing their Sentiments with decency and freedom; of peaceably assembling to consult their common good, and of applying
to Government by petition or remonstrance for redress of
grievances. Of these rights therefore they shall not be deprived by the Government of the United States. 9 '
While the natural rights language does not appear in the final draft
of the First Amendment, the Sherman draft is persuasive evidence
of the nexus between natural rights and freedom of expression, at
least in the minds of the framers.
88 THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 279 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
89 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 68, at 1029.
90 Id. at 1028. During this House debate, Representative Gerry urged adoption
of the Bill of Rights in order to secure ratification of the Constitution by Rhode
Island and North Carolina, which had publicly declined to ratify without the
amendments. Id. at 1037.
91 This bills of rights draft, in Roger Sherman's handwriting, was discovered in
1987 by the chief of the manuscript division of the Library of Congress, pasted in a
volume ofJames Madison's papers. See New York Times, July 29, 1987, at Al, col.
4. This draft of what Sherman had designated as the Second Amendment is also
reproduced in D. CRUMP, E. GRESSMAN, & S. REISS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 520 (1989).
Sherman was the only person to have signed all three of the founding documents, i.e., the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation and the

Constitution. He was obviously well schooled in the natural rights philosophy.
Had his version prevailed, that philosophy would have been expressly incorporated
into the Bill of Rights.
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Further evidence of the natural rights theory in action came
when the congressional committees refined and honed the proposal
to protect freedom of expression. In August of 1789, Representative Benson reported to the House that "[t]he committee who
framed this report proceeded on the principle that these rights belonged to the people; they conceived them to be inherent; and all
that they meant to provide against was their being infringed by the
Government.92 Madison later stated to the House that he conceived this protection to be "the most valuable amendment in the
whole list," so valuable that it should also "be secured against the
State Governments. '9 3 Unfortunately, Madison's suggestion of extending the First Amendment to the states was voted down. Over
135 years were to elapse before Madison's suggestion came to fruition. That occurred in the 1920's, when the Supreme Court first
began to apply the First Amendment to the states by incorporating
it into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 4
In sum, the First Amendment protection of freedom of expression is historically and thoroughly permeated with the concept of
natural, human, or fundamental rights, rights that stem from the
unique human capacity to think, to reason and to communicate rationally with others. This concept has been reaffirmed repeatedly in
modern times, both in Court opinions and otherwise. In 1948, for
instance, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and
proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes in its preamble "the inherent dignity" and "the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family." It then
proceeds to proclaim in Article 1 that "[a]ll human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason
and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood." Articles 18 and 19 accordingly declare that "everyone" has "the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion"
and "the right to freedom of opinion and expression . .. to seek,

receive and impart information and ideas" and to peaceably assemble and associate.
No better summary could be made of the philosophy and the
92 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 68, at 1090.

Id. at 1113.
See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 382 (1927); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 363, 371 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (incorporation
of the free speech provision). See also Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307
93
94

U.S. 496, 514 (1939) (incorporating the right to petition); Dejonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (incorporating the peaceable assembly provision); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (incorporating the free press provision).
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purpose that guided the framers of the First Amendment in 1789.
That philosophy and that purpose are timeless. It is there that we
find the true source, the true nature of the four freedoms of
expression.
IV.

THE GUARDIANS

OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Our final inquiry concerns the administration and execution
of the 1789 promises of expressive freedoms. Has the Supreme
Court, as the judicial arbiter of our constitutional freedoms, kept
faith with the natural-fundamental rights philosophy that underlies the First Amendment guarantees? To begin, those who
crafted the First Amendment clearly intended to put the judiciary
in administrative charge. James Madison, the chief architect, emphasized that point. Once these natural rights are embedded in
the Constitution, he told the House of Representatives in 1789,
independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a
peculiar manner the guardians of these rights; they will be an
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in
the legislative or executive; they will be naturally led to resist
every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the
constitution by the declaration of rights. 5
But the framers of the First Amendment could not and did not attempt to dictate the manner in which "the guardians of these rights"
should interpret and apply the guarantees of freedom of expression.
That 15roblem had to await the development of the newly created
Judicial Branch, as well as the development in the federal courts of a
"case or controversy" involving a First Amendment interpretation
and application. The latter development was particularly longum
tempus. The Bill of Rights, particularly the first eight amendments,
was originally designed to apply only to intrusions on freedom by
the federal government, not by the state governments. 9 6 Further,
95 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 68, at 1031. Jefferson had earlier written Madison

that one argument in favor of a bill of rights "which has great weight with me" was
"the legal check which it puts into the hands of the Judiciary." L. LEVY, supra note
72, at 120-21.

See also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter

ed.) (courts ofjustice must have the duty "to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void," for without that duty "all the reservations of
particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing").
96 Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court in Barron v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), ruled that the provisions of the
Bill of Rights "contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the
state governments. This court cannot so apply them. . . . [They are limitations
solely] on the exercise of power by the government of the United States."

250-51.

Id. at
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until the First Amendment was made applicable to the states more
than a century later, there were relatively few occasions to interpret
the amendment or to create standards of review.9 7
Despite the delayed development of the First Amendment, the
basic rules of its construction and interpretation were in place early.
They are the rules that apply to the construction and interpretation
of any constitutional provision, be it in the body of the document or
in any amendment thereto. For, as Chief Justice Marshall said in
McCulloch v. Maryland,9 8 "[w]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding," 9 9 "a constitution intended to endure for
ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises
of human affairs."' 0 0 Marshall elaborated on the enduring nature of
the Constitution in Cohens v. Virginia,'0 ' where he wrote that the basic rule of constitutional construction must recognize that
a constitution is framed for ages to come, and is designed to
approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it. Its course cannot always be tranquil. It is exposed
to storms and tempests, and its framers must be unwise statesmen indeed, if they have not provided it, as far as nature will
permit, with the means of self-preservation
from the perils it
0 2
may be destined to encounter.'
The key to creating an "immortal" Constitution, one that will
97 The First Amendment was first made applicable to the states in 1925, by way
of the incorporation doctrine, see supra note 94. It was not until 1965 that the
Supreme Court had occasion to use the First Amendment as originally intended,
i.e., to assess the validity of a federal law in light of First Amendment guaranteed
rights. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965).
The Alien and Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596 (1978), was indeed a patent
violation of the First Amendment. But the validity of that short-lived Act never
came before the Supreme Court. One hundred sixty-six years later, however, the
Court went out of its way to observe, obiter dicta, that the attack on the validity of
this Act "has carried the day in the court of history ... [reflecting] a broad consensus that the Act, because of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government
and public officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment." New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
During the congressional debates leading to the enactment of the Alien and
Sedition Act, Congressman Albert Gallatin was among those who argued that the
Act was "subversive of the principles of the Constitution itself," for "if you thus
deprive the people of the means of obtaining information of their [government
representatives'] conduct, you in fact render their right of electing nugatory." 8
ANNALS OF CONG. 2110 (1798). Congressman Edward Livingston also argued that
the liberty of slandering and libelling government, if it be deemed evil, "is an evil
perpetuated by the Constitution." Id. at 2153.
98 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
99 Id. at 407.
100 Id. at 415.
101 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
Id. at 387.

102
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exist for ages to come, is to write the non-self-executing provisions
in broad general language, capable of being interpreted, expanded
and applied to what Marshall called "the various crises of human
affairs[,] ...exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen
dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur."' 0 3 In an
earlier Court opinion, written by Justice Story in 1816, the observation was made that
[t]he constitution unavoidably deals in general language. It
did not suit the purposes of the people, in framing this great
charter of our liberties, to provide for minute specifications of
its powers, or to declare the means by which these powers
should be carried into execution. It was foreseen that this
would be a perilous and difficult, if not an impracticable, task.
The instrument was not intended to provide merely for the
exigencies of a few years, but was to endure through a long
lapse of ages, the events of which
were locked up in the inscru04
table purposes of Providence.'
Or, as Marshall put it, the very nature of an enduring constitution
demands that it not "partake of a prolixity of a political code" but
requires, rather, "that only its great outlines should be marked, its
important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which
compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects
themselves."' 0 5
This broad vision of the Constitution was viewed by Marshall
and Story as a principle of construction, broadly construing the
"general language" of the document so that the various crises of
future generations could be accommodated within the purview of
the textual terminology. Marshall also said that this principle of
broad construction had been entertained by the "framers of the
American constitution," a proposition "not only to be inferred from
the nature of the instrument, but from the language."' 0 6
Now it is true that Marshall and Story were talking of this principle of construction in the context of the broad affirmative powers
that the body of the Constitution confers on Congress and the judiciary, such as the broad Article I power to regulate commerce or the
broad Article III power to review all cases arising under the Constitution. But the broad construction trail does not end there. The
trail continues on into the area of the Bill of Rights, including the
14)3 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
104
105

Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816).
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407. See The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)

457, 531-34 (1870).

106 .lIcCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407.
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First Amendment. What principle of construction are we to apply to
such broad words as freedom of speech and freedom of the press?
Are these broad promises of freedom capable of protecting diversified and non-traditional forms of expression that so often mark our
modern, increasingly pluralistic society? Are these broad promises
capable of adapting and balancing these protected freedoms, weighing them against new forms of governmental intrusion and new governmental concerns and interests generated by our increasingly
electronic age? In short, are the natural rights of expression specified in the First Amendment capable of adaptation to meet the modern speech and press "crises" that the framers could not possibly
have foreseen?
Justice Brandeis is among the many who have observed that the
Court has consistently followed the McCulloch principle of broad
construction and has "repeatedly sustained the exercise of [the]
power by Congress .. .over objects of which the Fathers could not

have dreamed."'' 0 7 However, Justice Brandeis is preeminent in his
recognition that the same principle of broad construction also applies to the guarantees of individual freedom expressed in the Bill of
Rights. In his words, "[c]lauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific abuses of power, must have a similar capacity
of adaptation to a changing world."' 0 8 In support of his recognition
that the words of the Bill of Rights must have the capacity of adaptation, Brandeis turned to the Court's earlier ruling in Weems v. United
States.' °9 There the Court, in the context of a cruel and unusual
punishment case, again reiterated Marshall's broad construction
principle, adding that the general language in any part of a constitution should not
be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore
taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle t be vital must be
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not
ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions .... In the application of a constitution, therefore, our
contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what
may be. Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be
as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and

power. Its general principles would have little value and be
Olmstead v. United
dissenting).
107

1o

Id.

I09 217 U.S. 349 (1910).

States, 277

U.S. 438, 472 (1928)

(Brandeis, J..
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converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas.
Rights declared in words might be lost in reality.' "'
Thus, in Brandeis' view, the broad words of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments were capable of being interpreted and adapted
so as to outlaw invasions of a man's home by the "[s]ubtler and
more far-reaching means of invading privacy [that] have become
available to the Government.""' When Brandeis wrote these sentiments in 1928, and even more so today, the advances in what he
called "psychic and related sciences" had produced governmental
means of invading privacy that the framers of these amendments
could not have foreseen. Hence the appropriateness of applying
these provisions, in the words of Weems, in contemplation "not...
only of what has been, but of what may be."
The thirty-three words that embody such freedoms are capable
of interpretation and application so as to protect the individual not
only against the majoritarian intrusions that could be identified or
foreseen in 1789, but also against intrusions that could not have
been foreseen. As Weems and the earlier opinions of Marshall and
Story make clear, we have a Constitution - and a Bill of Rights deliberately designed and worded to be capable of wider application
than the mischiefs which gave it birth. The First Amendment is no
exception to that capability.
What gives the First Amendment freedoms of expression the
capability of protecting one from types of governmental intrusions
not foreseen in 1789? The answer is the historical fact that the
framers designed these freedoms as natural or fundamental rights,
reflective of the human spirit. The dimensions of a natural right are
capable of growth as the human spirit, as well as the modes of expressing that spirit, respond and interact in new and differing ways
to the exigencies pf each generation. A natural right is flexible
enough to adjust to the changing and evermore sophisticated demands of our increasingly pluralistic and urban society.
The freedoms of expression, moreover, are not designed solely
as a means of protection against eighteenth century limitations on
truth-seeking. Nor are they designed solely to protect those who
the framers anticipated would seek to participate in the democraticrepresentative processes, or would seek political change. Moreover,
it is questionable whether the prime motive of the framers was to
protect minority groups that might be systematically disadvantaged
110 Olnstead, 277 U.S. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
'I 1 Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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or excluded from whatJohn Hart Ely calls "the representation-reinforcing" values at the base of "the American system of representative democracy." ' 1 2 Nor are these freedoms designed solely to
promote the eighteenth century needs of self-fulfillment.
The framers were concerned with protecting much broader and
more adaptable values, the values of being a free human being capable of living in an ever-developing democratic society. To protect
those values and to identify the elements of humanity that should
remain uninhibited is the historic purpose of the First Amendment
freedoms. As Professor Tribe has put it, it is the constitutional text
identifying such positive freedoms "that invites a collaborative inquiry, involving both the Court and the country, into the contemporary contents and demands of freedom, fairness, and fraternity."' 13
Accordingly, it is to the text of the First Amendment that we
must first turn. There we find express references to the natural or
fundamental rights known as freedom of speech, press, assembly,
and petition, rights that have their own historic a'nd human values.
Those are the values, the rights, that must be balanced against any
effort by government to restrict or inhibit those values. As we have
seen, those are also the rights and the values that are capable of
change and adjustment in terms of new modes of human expression
and new societal conditions that may justify new kinds of restriction.
That capacity to change and grow, moreover, is triggered by use of
the historic rule of broad construction, making the First Amendment a provision "intended to endure for ages to come, and, conse' 14
quently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." "

The ultimate point is that it is the awesome responsibility of the
Supreme Court to identify and understand the human values implicit and written into the First Amendment freedoms, and then to
protect those values in assessing any form of official intrusion. That
is not to say that a recognition of the natural rights underlying these
freedoms justifies the injection of a judge's own "natural rights"
predilections and sympathies into First Amendment adjudication.
However, it is to say that a judge must begin the adjudication process with an understanding of the competing values that underlie
the freedom in controversy, as well as an understanding of the contemporary contents and obligations of that particular freedom.
Whether the judge describes those values in terms of "natural
rights," "fundamental rights," or "preferred rights" is of no moJ.ELY, supra note 42, at 101-02.
L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 771.
114 McCulloch v.Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
112
113
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ment. What is important is an appreciation of the historical fact that
the freedoms enshrined in the First Amendment were built upon the
framers' intention permanently "to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."' ' No one can say that this judicial task is easy, particularly that part which calls upon the judge to
determine which of the underlying "elements of being human" are
"left entirely to politics to protect, and which are entrusted to protection by judicial decree."'" 6
That task is made no easier by the raucous and not too helpful
debate among those who critique the judicial function of interpreting and applying the Constitution in terms of originalism, interpretivism, non-interpretivism, textualism, original intent, activism,
restraint, and the like. We are dealing here with a portion of the
Constitution that is designed to endure, to be adaptable to situations and crises that the 1789 framers of the First Amendment could
not possibly have foreseen. The strength and vitality of these expressive freedoms stem from the fact that they are natural rights,
and natural rights and principles are adaptable to changing events.
Justice Cardozo, in his magnificent little volume on The Nature of the
JudicialProcess,' 17 has captured and explained the nature of the judicial process in dealing with what he calls the "great generalities of
the constitution [that] have a content and a significance that vary
from age to age[,] ...

a constitution [that] states or ought to state not

rules for the passing hour, but principles for an expanding future.,,i1B The judicial function flourishes in this constitutional context, says Cardozo, only if the judge understands that the provision
in question must be kept flexible, adaptable, and supple. To do
that, the judge must draw upon and use the methods of philosophy,
history, tradition, and sociology. At times the judge must act as a
legislator to fill in the interstices of these "great generalities" and
the judge must always be mindful of the effect of precedent. This is
no easy task.
At least during the past fifty years or so, the Supreme Court has
performed well this "task of translating the majestic generalities of
the Bill of Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on officials
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 778-79.
117 B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 16 (1921).
115
116
118

Id. at 17, 83 (emphasis in original).
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dealing with the problems of the twentieth century.....,,9 Without attempting to summarize the whole of First Amendment jurisprudence, it suffices here to contrast two Supreme Court rulings,
one old, one new.
The older case is Patterson v. Colorado, 2 ' a decision written by
Justice Holmes in 1907, more than a decade before the beginning of
the modern reconstruction of the First Amendment. In that case, a
Colorado newspaper editor had been held in contempt for having
published certain articles and a cartoon that allegedly "reflected
upon the motives and conduct of the Supreme Court of Colorado in
cases still pending, and were intended to embarrass the court in the
impartial administration ofjustice."' 12 ' Because the free press provisions of the First Amendment had not yet been incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Holmes wrote the Court's opinion on the gratuitous assumption that freedom of speech and press
"were protected from abridgment on the part not only of the United
States but also of the States."' 1 22 He then ruled against Patterson on
an unduly narrow view of the free press provision of the First
Amendment, stating:
In the first place, the main purpose of such constitutional provisions is "to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other governments," and they
do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be
deemed contrary to the public welfare ....

The preliminary

freedom extends as well to the false as to the true; the subsequent punishment may extend as well to the true as to the
false. This was the law of
criminal libel apart from statute in
12 3
most cases, if not in all.
In his opinion, Justice Holmes gave no recognition to the motivations of the 1789 framers of the free speech and free press provisions. He did not recognize the values or purposes embodied in
those provisions, and he made no inquiry into whether the criminal
libel doctrine was any longer relevant to the America of 1907. Nor
119 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639.

120 205 U.S. 454 (1907).

121

Id. at 459.

122

Id. at 462.

123 Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Holmes' opinion cites only two

ancient state court opinions in support of this Blackstonian criminal libel analysis:
Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304 (1825); Respublica v. Oswald, I
Dall. 319 (1788). Yet, it is clear that the America of the revolutionary period generally accepted Blackstone's exposition of the common law restrictions on freedom of
expression, which included the punishment of those who wrote false opinions or
malicious scandals against the government. Only a few states recognized truth as a
defense to a criminal or seditious libel charge. See L. LEVY, supra note 72, at 201-03.
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is there any indication that he considered or used the broad rule of
construction that Justices Marshall and Story said were necessary to
keep the Constitution in shape for ages to come.124
Contrast Patterson with Texas v. Johnson,'5 the most recent First
Amendment case. By a 5-4 vote, the Court held that Johnson's
burning of the American flag constituted expressive conduct,
designed and intended to express his opposition to our government's nuclear war policies.' 2 6 He viewed and treated the flag as
symbolic of those policies, rather than as a symbol of national patriotic values. Johnson was thus held entitled to the protection of the
First Amendment's free speech clause. The result was to void his
conviction under a Texas law punishing intentional desecration of
"venerated objects" such as the national flag. 1 27
The majoritarian reaction to the Johnson decision was swift and
angry. One dramatic instance was a visceral demand by the President of the United States that the Constitution be amended to grant
124 See Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920). The Court affirmed Gilbert's
conviction, under a state statute, for having made a public anti-war speech, protesting America's involvement in World War I. In rejecting Gilbert's First Amendment arguments, the Court conceded "for the purposes of this case" that the right
of free speech is a natural and inherent right that was regarded, at the time the
nation was born, "as among the most sacred and vital possessed by mankind."
However, the Court held that this natural or inherent right is "not absolute" and is
"subject to restriction and limitation." Id. at 332 (Holmes, J., concurring). It
then
found a limitation in the fact that "every word that [Gilbert] uttered in denunciation of the war was false, was deliberate misrepresentation of the motives which
impelled it, and the objects for which it was prosecuted." Id. at 333 (Holmes, J.,
concurring). In dissent, Justice Brandeis found that the state law and the conviction thereunder were "inconsistent with the conceptions of liberty hitherto prevailing .... ." Id. at 336 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
125 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
126 Johnson's expressive conduct consisted of burning an American flag at the
end of a political demonstration in Dallas during the 1984 Republican National
Convention, apparently at the precise time when Ronald Reagan was being renominated for President. The state conceded that the purpose of the demonstration, of
which the flag-burning was a constituent part, was to protest the nuclear war policies of the Reagan administration and of certain Dallas-based corporations. The
demonstrators marched through the Dallas streets, stopping at targeted corporate
locations to dramatize the consequences of nuclear war by staging "die-ins," spraypainting building walls, and overturning potted plants. Johnson himself took no
part in such activities. The demonstration ended in front of the Dallas city hall. At
that point, Johnson accepted an American flag handed to him by a fellow protestor
who had taken it from a flag pole outside one of the targeted buildings. Johnson
unfurled the flag, doused it with kerosene, and set it on fire. While the flag burned,
the demonstrators chanted, "America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you."
No one was injured or threatened with injury, although several onlookers testified
they were seriously offended by the flag-burning. The demonstrators then dispersed without further incident. Id. at 2536-37.
127 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 1989).
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the power to Congress and the States to prohibit any physical desecration of the flag, a proposal that died in the Senate. 28 At the
same time, by an overwhelming majority, Congress voted to
"strengthen" the 1968 flag desecration statute.' 2 9 Neither the proposed amendment nor the statutory changes purport to address the
problem of flag-burning or desecration as a mode of political expression. Nor does either appear sufficient to preclude application
of the First Amendment, as interpreted and applied in Johnson, to a
political act of flag-burning.
The Johnson decision constitutes a climactic, albeit controversial, chapter in the 200-year history of the First Amendment. Unlike
the 1907 decision in Patterson, theJohnson ruling is a culminating exercise in First Amendment jurisprudence. It is firmly grounded on
precedents, established over the past fifty or more years, that hold:
(1) conduct intended to express an idea may be subject to First
128 The proposed amendment provided: "The Congress and the States shall
have the power to prohibit the physical desecration of the Flag of the United
States." S.J. Res. 180, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). On October 19, 1989, the
Senate voted in favor of the proposal by a 51 to 48 vote. But because an amendment requires a two-thirds vote of approval, the joint resolution proposing the
amendment was rejected. See 135 CONG. REC. S13733 (1989). The rejection effectively killed the proposed amendment, at least for the present.
During the Senate debate on the amendment, Senator Mitchell pointed out
that "the language of the proposed flag amendment does not specify which provision of the Bill of Rights it is intended to supercede or which element of the right of
free speech it is intended to suspend." 135 CONG. REc. S13732 (1989). Any legislation enacted pursuant to the proposed amendment, as Senator Mitchell noted,
would have to comply with the First Amendment and, unless the Court were to
change its mind, the rule of Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989), would still
prevail.
129 The Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-31, effective on October 28,
without the Presidents' signature, amended the 1968 flag desecration statute, 18
U.S.C. § 700, in several respects:
1. The 1968 statute punished "Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any
flag of the United States by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning, or trainpling upon it .... " The 1989 amendment changes this provision so as to punish
"Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the
floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States .... " The amendment also adds that this provision "does not prohibit any conduct consisting of the
disposal of the flag when it has become worn or soiled."
2. The 1989 amendment re-defines the term "flag of the United States" to
mean "any flag of the United States, or any part thereof, made of any substance, of
any size, in a form that is commonly displayed."
3. The 1989 amendment adds a new provision authorizing a direct appeal to
the Supreme Court from any interlocutory or final judgment of a district court ruling upon the constitutionality of the punishment provision. The Court is directed
"to accept jurisdiction over the appeal" if it has not previously ruled on the constitutional question, and to expedite the appeal to the greatest extent possible.
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Amendment protection;' 3 ° (2) conduct involving use of the American and other flags can be a symbolic form of communicating an
idea and expressing a political statement;' 3 1 (3) government cannot
make the communicative nature of conduct the basis for proscription without the very substantial showing of need that the First
Amendment requires, a need not demonstrated in Johnson; (4) governmental proscription cannot be based on the fact that an audience
takes serious offense at particular symbolic conduct; (5) an individual cannot be prosecuted for conduct that symbolically expresses
dissatisfaction with the policies of this country, "expression situated
at the core of our First Amendment values"; 3 2 (6) the First Amendment outlawry of punishment for that with which government or the
popular majority disagrees "is not dependent on the particular
mode in which one chooses to express an idea"; 3' and (7) government cannot foster its own view, or the public's view, of the flag by
prohibiting expressive conduct relating to

it. 1

4

Thus,Johnson is faithful not only to precedent but to the values
embedded in the First Amendment. It preserves something at the
central core of what it is to be human - the human urge and need
on occasion to speak unorthodox thoughts and to express these
thoughts in unorthodox ways. The Court once said that "if it is the
speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason
for according it constitutional protection.""'
It follows that if it is
the speaker's mode of expression that gives offense - and both the
government and the public have been grossly offended byJohnson's
flag-burning mode - "that consequence is a reason for according it
constitutional protection." 136 After all, the First Amendment is part
130 While the Court has rejected "the view that an apparently limitless variety of
conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea," United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376
(1968), it has insisted that conduct must be "sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication" to fall within the scope of the First Amendment. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974).
131 See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (attaching a peace
sign to the flag); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 568 (1974) (treating flag "contemptuously" by wearing small flag in seat of pants); Street v. New York, 394 U.S.
576, 594 (1969) ("state may not criminally punish a person for uttering words critical of the flag"); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632
(1943) (saluting the flag); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1931)
(displaying a red flag). Other flag desecration cases are collected and analyzed in
M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH at 3-49 to 3-64 (1984).
132 Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2543 (1989).
'33 Id. at 2544.
134 Id. at 2545.
135 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978).
136 Id.
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of a bill of rights for those with minority viewpoints and interests, a
bill of rights designed to protect minorities against the occasional
tyrannies and condemnations of governing majorities.
Finally, we ask: what are the source, nature, and purpose of
Johnson's right to express his opposition to the government's nuclear war policies by burning the American flag? What First Amendment values are at stake in this case? The majority opinion in
Johnson did not overtly attempt to address these questions. The
unarticulated premise of the decision, however, was that the First
Amendment's values and purposes must protect Johnson's right to
express himself in this unpopular manner. Under the natural or
fundamental rights theory that we have examined, Johnson as a
human being has a natural right, an individually autonomous right
of choice, to express himself in a peaceable manner in opposition to
majoritarian or governmental policies. Here, Johnson chose to express that opposition by burning a flag that he believed symbolized
policies that he opposed, a flag that served as a patriotic symbol to
virtually all other Americans. If we are faithful to the natural rights
underpinning of the First Amendment, we can only conclude, as did
the Court, that the government cannot force Johnson to change his
opinion as to what the flag symbolized to him.
Consider for a moment the inadequacy of any other First
Amendment justification for Johnson's expressive conduct:
1. Johnson's conduct contributes little if anything to the search
for truth with respect to our government's nuclear war policies. Nor
can we confidently say, in the words ofJustice Holmes, that the best
test of truth as to those policies "is the power of the [flag-burning]
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. 137
2. It is equally difficult to find very much "democracy-promotion" in Johnson's expressive act of burning the flag. We must of
course maintain the opportunity for free public discussion of political issues "to the end that [representative] government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may
be obtained by peaceful means."' 3 8 It is unlikely that government
or the public will be very responsive toJohnson's form of discussing
our nuclear issues. Indeed, the public abhorrence of flag-burning
could prove counter-productive, at least from Johnson's political
viewpoint.
3. Finally, it is difficult to premise Johnson's expressive burning
of the flag on his innate desire for self-fulfillment, or realization of
137 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
138 DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 352, 365 (1937).
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his character, or advancement of potentialities as a human being.' 3 9
We can doubt whether the First Amendment was designed primarily
to create a public therapeutic forum wherein Johnson can satisfy his
self-fulfillment needs of expression by way of a flag-burning. There
must be more value to the First Amendment than that.
And so perforce we return to the original purposes and values
that inspired the framers to draft the First Amendment. What Johnson did was an articulation of the idea of freedom that is latent in all
human consciousness. He gave expression to his natural and fundamental right to speak freely, to criticize governmental policies, to
utilize a mode of expression that is unorthodox, and to the extreme
- but not to the point of creating an imminent threat of violent
reaction or being in violation of some other reasonable time, place,
or manner restriction. Some people may exercise this innate right
in an "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" manner, making "vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks......,40
Some people may use their innate, natural right to express ideas in
an extreme manner that society finds offensive or disagreeable or
unpatriotic. That is precisely what the First Amendment is designed
to protect. As the Court once observed: "Constitutional provisions
' 41
are based on the possibility of extremes."'
In short,Johnson properly treats the First Amendment as preservative of the individual's natural right to speak out in unorthodox
ways, to speak in the form of expressive conduct distasteful to the
majority. The First Amendment is directed toward protection of
that natural right, not toward preservation of venerable or patriotic
symbols, not toward prescribing or forcing orthodox forms of expressive conduct. That the content of the individual's political statement or the mode of making such a statement may be
overwhelmingly contrary to majoritarian beliefs only makes it the
more appropriate to invoke First Amendment protections.' 4 2
It is unfortunate to celebrate the bicentennial of the First
Amendment by trying to create a "patriotic symbol" exception, the
first effort ever made to dilute any part of the Bill of Rights. If such
See Emerson, supra note 7, at 879.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
141 General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 226-27 (1908).
142 As Justice Kennedy noted in his concurring opinion in Johnson, the Court was
dealing with "a pure command of the Constitution" and, regardless of whether
Johnson could appreciate the enormity of the offense he gave, "the fact remains
that his acts were speech, in both the technical and the fundamental meaning of the
Constitution." He also observed that it is "poignant but fundamental that the flag
protects those who hold it in contempt." Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2548
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
139
140
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an effort were to succeed, we would then be dimming one of the
fixed stars in our constitutional constellation - "that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein."'' 41 We would then be
adding to the Constitution the offensive notion that, whenever
"overbearing majorities" have been passionately and patriotically
upset by a Supreme Court interpretation of the First Amendment,
"We the People" disavow the moral and natural right values underlying the First Amendment to the extent that those values lead to
the result reached by the Court.
Despite these inept and so far unsuccessful efforts to overrule
it, the decision in Johnson represents the most enduring values and
purposes of the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of expression. By definition, it is a natural right to express one's political
dissent by means of burning what one views as a symbol of governmental policies with which one disagrees. The ability to think, to
rationalize, and to express unpopular thoughts through one's conduct constitutes the most natural, the most fundamental aspect of
the autonomous self. That such an act produces widespread public
condemnation only underscores the wisdom of the framers, who
sought to protect unpopular expressions from abridgement by occasional "overbearing majorities." The framers did so by framing a
natural right in terms that will endure for ages to come. Let it remain that way.
143

West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

